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Chapter 11
Bentham’s image: 
The corpo-reality check
Carolyn shapiro
Among Jeremy Bentham’s myriad manuscripts, the arduous reading, 
editing and transcribing of which contributes to the work of many a 
scholar in this volume and quite a few scholars before now, one partic-
ularly peculiar manuscript was withheld from circulation at the time 
of Bentham’s death by his then editor John Bowring. This manuscript, 
written at some point close to his death in 1832, was entitled ‘Auto-Icon; 
or, Farther Uses of the Dead to the Living’.1 It argues for the benefits of 
preserving and displaying the heads of our dead bodies, a last act that 
would uphold Bentham’s utilitarian principle of the greatest happiness 
of the greatest number. Bentham’s amusing proposed models for Auto-
Iconism ranged from New Zealanders ‘in reference to the preservation of 
their friends’,2 to Persian edifices constructed by the skulls of men slain 
in battle,3 to the performances of the ‘Lecturer-Errant or Itinerant upon 
heads’ George Alexander Stevens4 (Figure 11.1). 
The late Canadian scholar Robert Fenn’s carefully annotated 
version of this essay attempts to correct what he deemed the damage 
done to Bentham’s legacy by the prudish Bowring. Bentham’s anti-reli-
gious writings and his manuscripts redeeming sexual irregularities were 
similarly considered inappropriate to be published. In this chapter, I 
would first like to discuss the Auto-Icon: the title of Bentham’s preserved 
body itself, the essay by the same name, and Bentham’s instructions 
annexed to his Last Will and Testament explaining the process by which 
he wanted his body to be ‘Auto-Iconized’. For Bentham, his self-portrait 
is what he described as ‘an auto-graph of a higher order’:5 autographic, 
in the sense that like a signed autograph, Bentham’s image works as an 
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indexical ‘graph’, or piece of writing, ‘of’ himself, bearing the physical 
trace – or more than a trace – of its subject. ‘Auto-Icon will soon be 
understood,’ Bentham proposes, ‘for a man who is his own image. … Is 
not identity preferable to similitude?’6 Despite a few infelicities-to-be 
about the robustness of the body itself (for example, the separated head 
being stolen by prankster King’s College, London students), Bentham’s 
Auto-Icon was arguably the fullest realization of his greatest happiness 
principle. Through the mingling of writing, image and corporeal 
body, Bentham’s Auto-Icon is the corpo-realization of what underlies 
Bentham’s theories of language, logic and legislation: the resolution to 
work language back to a tangible real entity. In many ways, as will be 
elaborated below, Bentham’s theories of language can be said to be his 
primary vehicle for his overall proposition of the requisite corporeality 
underlying his greatest happiness principle. 
Figure 11.1: Thomas Rowlandson (1757–1827), A Lecture on Heads, 
1808.
Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York.
I propose that Bentham’s notion of real entities is throughout his writings 
insistent, in particular, on a foregrounding of the human body. This fore-
grounding is evident through his applied metaphors of the body. But just 
as ‘the image of Bentham’ is not a figure but the ‘real thing’, so too in his 
writing Bentham works beyond metaphorical figure. For Bentham, the 
act of writing itself works to infuse his metaphorical figures of speech 
with the ‘real substance’ of the human body, realized not only through 
the hindsight of his Auto-Icon corpse, but through his construction of his 
vast body of writing as corpus. Ultimately, I want to consider Bentham’s 
writing – he did a lot of it! – as performative act. Reading Of Sexual 
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Irregularities, and Other Writings on Sexual Morality, and Not Paul, but 
Jesus in conjunction with the Auto-Icon supports Bentham’s aspiration 
for language to be grounded by physical substance. On some psycho-
logical level, conscious or unconscious, Bentham’s writing is a physical, 
corporeal activity that I want to examine in relation to the physical 
pleasures afforded by the ‘eccentric propensities’ and ‘equivalent 
pleasures’ offered by not Paul, but Jesus. In this sense, ‘Bentham’s Image’ 
encompasses the felicities and physical pleasures of the act of writing. 
Furthermore, ‘Bentham’s Image’, being Bentham’s own body, is also 
part of the negotiation of bequeathed ‘property’ that takes place upon 
one’s death. In Bentham’s world of greatest happiness, the physically 
closer an entity is to what it refers to, that is, the more an entity comes 
from an ‘own-ness’, the more successfully utilitarian it is. This tendency 
towards felicity happens because something proper to another thing is 
going to be more grounded in materiality and less prone to fictionaliza-
tion. The Auto-Icon, Bentham says, would allow for ‘every man [to be] 
his own broker’ or ‘every man [to be] his own lawyer’.7 Bentham proudly 
announces that, ‘A spick-and-span new subject-matter of property 
is brought for the first time into existence.’8 The image of Bentham is, 
therefore, highly Utilitarian not only in its social contribution but also 
in its epitomizing of the proper that comes through in Bentham’s overall 
philosophy: the image is Bentham’s ‘own’. 
A brief foray into Bentham’s contention with legal fiction lays 
the groundwork of Bentham’s desire to ground everything in the 
physicality of the human body. He particularly decries the maintenance 
of the ‘Fictions of Law’, legal ‘bodies’ constituted solely through linguistic 
positing. These fictional bodies of law get reiterated so frequently that 
what the language merely signifies is taken for something ‘real’. In a 
footnote to his discussion of motion, Bentham presents his allegory of the 
sitting automaton, a figure that appears to be real in that it is presented 
‘in the dress of a man … constructed by the ingenuity of the mechanist’9 
(Figure 11.2). 
As such, the constructed automaton personifies the deceptive 
operation of fiction that forms the bedrock of bad legislation and morality. 
The fiction of the legal person is part of Bentham’s overall critique of 
fiction. Charging from the earliest moment of his writing career onwards 
that the spread of Fiction is ‘pestilential’,10 Bentham’s immoderate 
solution of auto-iconization should not be surprising. The Auto-Icon as 
‘legal person’ is not a function of language, but an annexation of real 
property, and, as such, it is the ‘bodying forth’, the propriation, of the 
legal person11 (Figure 11.3). 
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Figure 11.2: Detail of automaton drawing reprinted from Brian Selznick, 
The Invention of Hugo Cabret.
Copyright © 2007 by Brian Selznick by 
permission of Scholastic Inc.
Figure 11.3: The Auto-Icon.
University College London.
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Bentham’s Last Will and Testament bequeaths not only his 
manuscripts – his corpus – but, first of all, his corpse, to the University 
of London Medical School.12 Revised on 30 May 1832, the Will opens 
with instructions for his dead body, as soon as ascertained dead, to be 
immediately delivered to his close friend Dr Southwood Smith, who was 
to preserve it in the manner expressed in the ‘Annex’ to the Will. But 
even preceding the explicit instructions in the ‘Annex’, Bentham tells his 
executors what is to be done with his skeleton: it is to be propped up in 
a chair ‘in the attitude in which I am sitting when engaged in thought 
in the course of time employed in writing,’ clad (and stuffed) in one of 
his typical black suits, his staff in hand.13 Part B of the Will, also entitled 
‘Auto-Icon’, is dated before the first part of the Will at 13 April 1830, 
and is written in a different hand from that of the Will: ‘What follows 
in a hand different from mine was drawn up some little time ago at my 
desire by Dr. Southwood Smith M.D. witness my hand Jeremy Bentham. 
[Bentham signs].’14 Bentham’s amanuensis will also become Bentham’s 
dissector. Three days after Bentham died, Southwood Smith carried 
out Bentham’s request. The doctor delivered an oration over Bentham’s 
corpse at the Webb Street School of Anatomy and Medicine and the 
dissection was performed shortly afterwards.15 
Southwood Smith’s hand, in both capacities of amanuensis and 
dissector, has a parallel in the editing hand. To say that Bentham wrote 
prolifically would be an understatement; he seemed to write obsessively, 
continuously, for over sixty years. He would have been writing with the 
presumption, and invitation, for the cutting, shaping hand of the editor. 
The sheer amount of handwritten pages in the manuscript boxes in UCL 
Library comprise a corpus: so many analogies can be drawn between 
Bentham’s written corpus and his actual body, both of which required 
intervention by a fashioning hand in order to achieve a presentable 
finished product, for the greater good. He also frequently inserts his 
own ‘hands’ into his manuscripts where he wants to make additions 
(Figure 11.4).
Reading the editors’ introduction to Of Sexual Irregularities, and 
Other Writings on Sexual Morality,16 one gets a distinct sense of the 
physical materiality of the manuscripts. Bentham had an elaborate 
writing process by which he left himself, and his future editors, 
indications or suggestions about insertions, incorporations, earmarks, 
chapter headings and sub-headings, running headings, descriptive 
headings, titles, margins, footnotes, ‘rudiments’ and appendices to the 
text sheets composed of unruled composition paper.17 Other notable 
markings include brackets and braces, numbering of various chapters 
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and sections, deletions and emendations (Bentham’s own and the 
editors’ too). Bentham apparently was not consistent with punctuation,18 
and so relied upon his editors for this mode of clarification. In order to 
help his editors with such sprawling textual stuff, Bentham organized the 
manuscripts into what he called ‘spencers’, on which he wrote descriptive 
headings. These so-called spencers served as helpful indexes in the 
content.19 He creatively re-deployed a word which, following the Oxford 
English Dictionary, otherwise refers to either a kind of wig, or a short 
double-breasted overcoat without tails, or to a kind of close-fitting jacket 
or bodice commonly worn by women and children.20 But Bentham’s 
usage of it also implies his writing is a body needing to be clothed, the 
spencers also helpfully giving that body its organization.21 Approaching 
Bentham’s work as a material writing scenario, the manuscripts are 
almost plastic in their readiness to be shaped, beckoning to be ‘worked’ 
by supplemental hands. We certainly get a sense of tangible substance. 
This substance is corporeal material, directly emanating from Bentham’s 
hand, a parallel body to what would become his Auto-Iconized body. 
Figure 11.4: A manicule, in Bentham’s hand (18 May 1823).
UC cxxxix. 330.
Throughout his writing, Bentham’s greatest happiness principle is 
conveyed figuratively through a fundamentally bodily lexicon. In more 
recent philosophical applications, we have seen that a bodily lexicon 
gets conferred upon consciousness and subjectivity. Bentham’s bodily 
approach was generally not about consciousness or subjectivity as much 
as it was about the way in which language, and the actions conferred by 
language, ought to be backed by the reality of a body. In this sense, the 
body worked as the material gateway to good principles of morals and 
legislation. For Bentham, ontology or being itself could only be based 
in substance that is perceived through the bodily senses. A real existing 
entity is real, for example, because it is ‘tangible’. 
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Bentham’s language is infused with signifiers of the body. Although 
his fundamental measuring units of pleasure and pain may signify 
beyond literal bodies, both those terms do bear immediate bodily 
denotations. Other terms also have bodily assumptions, although not 
so immediate. I am particularly interested in Bentham’s fundamental 
notion of ‘mischief’. ‘Mischievousness’ is the name given by Bentham to 
signify what is perhaps the launching point of his entire philosophical 
project: the infelicitous outcome of legislation based upon the fiction 
of natural and so-called unwritten law. ‘Mischief’ is Bentham’s name 
for the ‘the divergency from the common end of Happiness’.22 Bentham 
loved his etymological footing and his choice of the word ‘mischief’ is 
felicitous in and of itself. From the Middle English and Anglo-French 
word mes-chef, for misfortune, and from Old French meschever, to come 
out badly, without a head, chief, or end, ‘mischief’ is the ideal discourse 
for infelicitous outcomes that would have been the result of having no 
proper head, and, by inference, no proper body. We know that the head 
for Bentham stands in, synechdocally, for the entire body, because of 
what will be proposed in his Auto-Icon final essay. Once aware of the 
body-language Bentham loves to use so much, we see that most parts of 
the body frequently find their way into his general lexicon. Another term 
worth mentioning, particularly in the context of his writings on sexual 
irregularities, is ‘noxious’. In one of the main examples of the use of this 
term, Bentham condemns public opinion’s severe condemnation of what 
he sees as the ‘least noxious, or altogether innoxious’ instances (such as 
irregular sexual acts) because these condemnations are little governed 
by utility, whereas acts which he deems ‘most noxious’ are indulged.23 
Bentham also gives us the example, in Not Paul, but Jesus, of the act 
of usury being ‘innoxious’, and therefore not justifiably punishable by 
law.24 The Latin word noxa means ‘harm’. But the etymologically astute 
Bentham, ‘grecianized ear’ always on the alert,25 also knew that before 
the Latin noxa came the Greek word nekros, meaning ‘dead body’. 
‘Noxious’ refers to harm – deadly harm – done to the body. 
But Bentham was not operating exclusively on the levels of 
figurative language and etymology. He also addressed the primacy 
of the body on a thematic level. A consideration of Bentham’s anti-
religious manuscripts debunking existence in the after-life reveals his 
proposition for the primacy of the body to be the foundation of existence. 
In his very helpful book Bentham: A Guide for the Perplexed,26 Philip 
Schofield recounts Bentham’s rebuttal of his contemporaries’ religionist 
proposition that the soul would exist in the after-life without the body: 
bEntHAM’s iMAgE 277
Bentham noted that during life human beings experience sensation 
and thought, and that such sensation and thought was located 
in the brain and nervous system. At death, however, both brain 
and nervous system ceased to function. Bentham asked: ‘A mind 
altogether without a body, in what sense, respect or degree is 
it to be identical with the same mind united with its body as in 
the present state?’ Mind, a fictitious entity, consisted in nothing 
more than a combination of pleasures, pains, wants, desires and 
propensities. All the pleasures and pains of the mind had their 
source in pleasures and pains of the body. How are these wants to 
be supplied, desires gratified, and propensities given way to, by a 
mind without a body?27
Bentham’s ‘objections absolutely insuperable’28 to the Christian 
proposition that a soul could ‘exist’ without a body as its indicator of 
pleasure and pain become manifest in his writing on sexual irregularities.
In Of Sexual Irregularities, and Other Writings on Sexual Morality, 
Bentham’s exposition of ‘that antipathy which springs up on the ground 
of taste … produced by difference of taste’29 provides a more complex 
understanding of Bentham’s contentions. ‘Antipathy’ also has bodily 
co-ordinates: the human breast, Bentham repeatedly writes, is the seat 
of antipathy. Bentham uses the word ‘breast’ in this context so frequently 
that it would prompt any close reader to try to figure out exactly how and 
why he employs it. The breast, for Bentham, is the ready seat of public 
odium, and he positions it as part of the artillery of injustice: 
The truth is that, by the epithet unnatural, when applied to any 
human act or thought, the only matter of which it affords any 
indication that can be depended upon is the existence of a sentiment 
of disapprobation, accompanied with passion, in the breast of the 
person by whom it is employed: a degree of dissocial passion by 
which without staying to enquire or to consider with himself 
whether the practice, and thence the conduct and character of 
him whose practice it is, be or be not in any way, and if in any way 
in what degree, noxious to society, he endeavors, by the use thus 
made of this inflammatory word, to kindle and point towards the 
object of his ill-will, that same dissocial passion in other breasts, for 
the purpose of inducing them to join with him in producing pain in 
some shape or other in the breast of him by whom the passion has 
been excited.30
bEntHAM AnD tHE Arts278
Here, Bentham’s uses words such as ‘passion’, ‘inflammatory’, ‘kindle’, 
‘join’, and ‘excited’ to characterize what happens when the word 
‘unnatural’ gets affixed to any given event or practice, public opinion 
thus spreading, like fire, to ‘other breasts’. Bentham follows this with 
several more examples of breast-passion, including the rebellion of 
the Stuart claimants to the throne having been deemed ‘unnatural’, 
thus ‘[producing] … in all breasts that are not already on his side, a 
disposition to join in whatsoever measures may be taken for causing him 
to suffer’,31 going on to set up antipathy, public opinion and judgmental 
taste as being unworthy foundations for morals and legislation, as they 
would most certainly fail the test of utility for the greater good. 
Religion was the main culprit in Bentham’s eyes for things anti-
thetical to his greatest happiness principle. As we shall see in the essays 
on sexual irregularities as well as in Not Paul, but Jesus, the dominance 
of Mosaic law and of the Mosaic dispensation of justice constructs active 
barriers against the general reception of Bentham’s radical revisioning of 
a non-metaphysical, non-moralizing foundation for legislation. He is up 
against the vengeful passion held and distributed across the ‘breasts’ of 
the people. Bentham proposes that Moses and the Old Testament laid the 
groundwork for religion itself and its ‘theatre of rigours’.32 This theatre of 
rigours was responsible, he writes, for the transposition of physical dirt 
and impurities into moral impurity. The belief in moral impurity took its 
strength in the lodging of fear of punishment into the adherents of Mosaic 
law. Much to Bentham’s horror, what is deemed ‘immoral’, for example, 
sexual intercourse with someone of the same sex or with another species, 
cannot be ‘washed away but with blood’,33 instigating a relentless justifi-
cation for boundless cruelty and misery which has no ‘real’ grounding. 
Bentham shows that the introduction of religion justifies the consequent 
leap from physicality to morality by invoking the breast as the seat of the 
gratification of antipathy and fear:
In the breast of Moses, the sentiment of antipathy found an object 
and an exciting cause in every sort of irregularity belonging to this 
class. Religion was at his command: in Religion, every caprice to 
which, in his fertile brain, imagination had ever given birth found a 
ready instrument, and that an irresistible one. In English the word 
impurity, in most other languages some other word or words that 
correspond to it, had been applied alike to objects unpleasant to 
sense, and offensive to imagination. In the head of tyranny, at the 
nod of caprice, physical impurities were converted into moral ones. 
Under Moses as under Bramah, the list of impurities thus created, 
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sometimes out of nothing, sometimes out of physical impurities, 
was a labyrinth without end. The more extensive and above all the 
more indefinite the system of penal law, the more transgressions 
on the part of the subject many: the more transgression, the more 
fear: the more fear in the breast of the subject many, the more 
power in the hand of the ruling few. Wherever the people are in a 
shivering fit, the physician of their souls is absolute. Observation 
was made of physical impurities, discovery was made of moral, 
and then converted into religious impurities: for the cleansing of 
physical impurities water might serve: moral impurities required 
blood.34
Here, the quick conversion from something physical to the register of the 
moral fed the fear, causing a ‘shivering fit’ and requiring an ‘absolute’ 
physician. For Bentham, operating in the abstract realm of antipathy 
and morality is dangerously ungrounded, paving the way for tyranny 
and absolutism. What gets lost in this transposition into antipathy is the 
requisite tangibility of the real body that ought to manage the springs of 
action. 
The anti-utilitarian, ascetic conversion from physical impurity to 
moral impurity presented as the starting point of Bentham’s critique 
on religion receives explicit parsing and exposition in a compelling 
subtext entitled ‘Purity – impurity’ that spans the bottom of three 
pages.35 Implying the arbitrariness of names and signs in typical proto-
semiotic fashion, Bentham homes in on the word ‘impurity’, from which 
so much misery has flowed. An ‘impure’ thing, he points out, can easily 
be brought back to its real state of purity because a real body, which 
is, for example, covered in dust, can be washed with water to become 
‘pure’ again. An impure mind, on the other hand, would be character-
ized by sin, wickedness and guilt. Hence, an impure body can become 
pure when the body is cleansed, and by analogy, an impure, guilty mind 
can be purified by cleaning away the psychological impurities. However, 
when an impure body bypasses the literal bodily referent (dirt, sexual 
irregularities, etc.) to signify immediately psychological impurities, here 
the play of fiction instigates its inexorable take-over, as Bentham states: 
‘Filth is on the body, therefore guilt, sin, wickedness, impurity is in the 
mind: here comes the false logic – here comes the wandering of the 
imagination – here comes the pernicious error. … Error is now mounted 
upon error.’36 
In order to check this error-mounted-upon-error, a problem 
that is specific to religionists and moralists but which also affects all 
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other applications of language, Bentham devised a complicated ‘filling 
up’ operation he called ‘phraseoplerosis’, followed by what he called 
‘paraphrasis’. In these dual operations, language is worked towards the 
physical, supplied with and thus translated into ‘real entities’ in order 
to move away from fictional abstraction.37 Philip Schofield clarifies this 
operation: ‘[P]araphrasis occurs when a sentence in which the name of 
the fictitious entity appears is translated into another sentence in which 
the words are either real entities, or are more nearly related to real entities. 
There is both a translation of the sentence, and a movement towards the 
physical.’38 One particular pathway to the physical that Bentham himself 
practices is the anchoring of his own writing in the etymological origins 
of given words. Bentham’s avowed possession of a ‘grecian ear’, which he 
is happy to impart ‘to an ungrecian ear’ in need of explanation,39 affords 
him an immediacy with the material, real referent behind a word, and 
so we can assume that he chooses his words carefully, that is, paraphras-
tically. In one example discussed in Chrestomathia, the word obligation 
comes from the Latin root ligo, meaning, to bind. The root produces 
an image of a band that not only visualizes the word obligation (which 
names the practice of being bound or fastened to any other) but grounds 
it in a material real entity – the original root. ‘[T]he root of the word, 
employed as a sign for the designation of that idea … lies in a material 
image, employed as an archetype or emblem: viz., the image of a cord, or 
any other tie or band.’40 The archetype that comes forth from the etymo-
logical origin acts as an index into what is real: ‘In the case of every name 
of an immaterial object, the archetype is at once an index and a holdfast to 
the sense of it’, Bentham writes, adding, ‘In the case of every name of a 
fictitious entity, the only sure test of intellection is paraphrasis.’41 But the 
reality of the etymological archetype behind a word seems, typically, to 
get repressed, yielding to an ‘original import [that is] misexpressive’.42 
Thus import itself, also to be understood as signification, works against 
expression, as indexed by the archetype, that would emanate from the 
real entity. The work of paraphrasis is considerable!43 
In today’s lingo, we might say that these linguistic manoeuvres 
encourage an ongoing ‘reality check’. From his writings on sexual irreg-
ularities, we can see that Bentham sees this movement away from the 
physical body into metaphysical abstraction as a hostile take-over of 
reality that results in vengeful and religiously justified violence such 
as using fire and blood instead of water to purify a dirty body. In Not 
Paul, but Jesus, Bentham sets up a binary opposition between Paul and 
Jesus, creating an axis respectively dividing mischief from utility. In 
this engaging text, Bentham takes issue with the religiously inspired 
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principle of asceticism. Instigated by Mosaic law and propagated by Paul, 
asceticism’s denial of bodily pleasure and its replacement of pleasure 
with the bidding of pain lies at the heart of Bentham’s contestation of 
Religion and Natural Law. Bentham’s exegeses on the New Testament 
and on the relevant books of the Old Testament scrutinize what he 
declares to be the fundamental mischievousness of asceticism. The focus 
on asceticism allows Bentham, and us, to comprehend in a more complex 
way the relation between the body and mischief in all of Bentham’s phil-
osophical propositions. Bentham proposes that ‘under the principle of 
asceticism [favoured by Paul but not by Jesus], condemnation is passed 
on the pleasures of the body without enquiry’,44 and that, furthermore, 
a disastrous sublation of physicality by morality, of the body by the 
mind, takes place. The Paul/Jesus axis serves to pinpoint the pivotal 
leap of logic underpinning the mischief perpetrated by asceticism. Jesus 
is put forward here as denouncing the leap into groundless pronounce-
ments of immorality. Jesus, explains Bentham, condemned the Mosaic 
assumption that ‘by a trifling physical impurity, a serious moral depravity 
might be produced’.45
Reading this pronouncement we cannot help but note that Bentham 
is not simply saying that religion and asceticism are replacing the body 
with the abstract mind. He is objecting to the heart being trafficked into 
the moral order: 
Here then may be seen a sentence of condemnation passed at any 
rate upon this part of the Mosaic Law: the assumption on which it 
had been grounded was the supposition that, by any thing taken 
in to a man’s body in a physical sense, his heart (Mat. xv. 18; Mark 
vii. 19) in a psychological sense – his heart put as usual for his moral 
character – could be defiled.46
The asceticists are not discounting the body; they are taking up the body 
for their own ‘erroneous’ and ‘disordered’ purposes. 
Bentham himself does not use the word ‘misappropriation’, but I 
think it is a useful term for characterizing the movement of mischief – 
which comprehends the linguistic move away from a word’s immediate 
reference to the body, from being proper to that which it is referring, to 
a word claiming to be ‘proper to’ its referent but which drops its proper 
physical connection in a kind of trick, a sleight of hand. This chicanery is 
difficult to spot because of what happens when antipathy takes harbour in 
the breast: the breast houses the heart, through the heart blood courses. 
The prodigious momentum of pathos works to overtake the bodily 
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grounding to which it vehemently lays claim. Bentham’s abhorrence of 
legislated punishment through bloodletting (e.g. capital punishment) 
would be a good example of what he sees as a violent claiming of the 
body for mischievous and malign purposes. 
The following passage from ‘Of Sexual Irregularities’ explains the 
persecution of homosexual irregularity as an example of the violent 
commandeering of the breast, by those for whom antipathy forms the 
basis of morality:
Of the violence of that antipathy, whether real or affected, of which 
the propensities in question have, in the British isles, beyond all 
other countries, been the object – of the violence of that thirst 
which nothing less than the heart’s blood of the intended victims 
marked out for slaughter by the dissocial appetite has hitherto 
been able to satisfy. The principal causes have now been brought 
to view: and in the view thus given of them it has been seen that, 
in the number of them, no such quality in it as that of a tendency 
to make in any shape a defalcation [deduction] from the aggregate 
sum of human happiness has place: and that, in this dissocial and 
misery-engendering affection, whatsoever fault there is has for its 
seat the breasts, not of those who are the objects of this antipathy, 
but of those who harbor it.47
Thus Bentham takes issue with the co-opting of the body by the ascetics 
who have laid claim to blood and breast, not to mention to pain itself. On 
the contrary, for Bentham, the ‘sexual irregularity’ of the homosexual, as 
a ‘propensity’, is the better utilitarian model in that the actions performed 
are proper to the body performing the action, unlike the misappropri-
ated corpo-reality abused by moralizing religionists. 
In this final section before I conclude, I would like to expand upon 
the character of the body that Bentham defends so rigorously. This body 
type that he puts forward is one that is epitomized by Jesus’s teachings, 
by Jesus himself, and also by the homosexual body, defended examples of 
which abound both within the footnotes and body of Bentham’s writings 
on sexual irregularities and on religion. I want to suggest, perhaps boldly, 
that for Bentham, the homosexual body, with its propensities eccentric 
and its social and sexual intercourses, is an open body, a body that invites 
others to be a part of it, to partake of it. It is also a propense body that 
fulfils the reality check required for acquiring greatest happiness. Like 
the ‘socially effusive’ Greek male homosexual relationships Bentham 
cites as examples that existed without the imposition of metaphysical 
bEntHAM’s iMAgE 283
‘spiritualization’ of the lovers,48 Jesus stands for a body felicitously 
open to the physicality of other bodies. Bentham argues that Jesus 
had intercourse with Mary Magdalene,49 with St John, who, Bentham 
repeatedly tells us in italics, was ‘lying on Jesus’ breast’50 (this would be 
an example of a ‘good breast’), and with the young male ‘stripling with 
loose attire’ who remained Jesus’ most faithful devotee.51 
Jesus’s intercourse, social and sexual, works here in opposition to 
the ‘wall of separation’ instituted by the Pharisees and their subsequent 
followers. For Bentham, ‘the avowed design – of keeping up a wall – 
an everlasting wall – of separation between this and every other: the 
prevention of all convivial and thence of all social intercourse’ is dissolved 
by Jesus when he says, in the books of Mark and Matthew: ‘There is 
nothing from without a man, that entering into him can defile him: but 
the things which come out of him, those are they that defile the man.’52 
Bentham embraces this welcoming of entry into the human body, as we 
see throughout ‘Of Sexual Irregularities’ when he sets up an equivalence 
between the appetite for food and the appetite for sex. He is proposing an 
intercoursing body with ‘inlets’ to pleasure, which he characterizes in a 
footnote to the first chapter of Not Paul, but Jesus: 
Though not the seats nor the sources, the eye and the ear are, in 
the instance of every individual, the necessary inlets to a large 
proportion of such pleasures of the mind as it falls in his way to 
enjoy: viz. to all those derived from discourse, whether by signs 
audible or visible – whether from hearing or reading. So likewise 
in the case of all the rest of the fine arts – Music, painting, &c., &c., 
let the seat be in ever so large proportions of it in the mind, the 
necessary inlet to it is in the body.53
This body of inlets defies the multiple prohibitions of ‘admixture’ called 
for by Mosaic law.54 
Conclusion
When Bentham wrote, and wrote, and wrote, he wrote with the 
assumption that other hands would be introduced into the corpus of his 
work; in particular the editorial hands of others, but also his own little 
drawn hands inserted into the manuscripts. One particular editor he 
desired to give his work shape, clarity, even some aesthetic guidance, the 
desire for whose editing hand was proposed in the concluding paragraphs 
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of the chapter ‘General Idea of Not Paul, but Jesus’, was William Thomas 
Beckford, author of the History of the Caliph Vathek, published in 1786. 
Bentham invites Beckford to be his editor and collaborator in the Not 
Paul, but Jesus venture (Figure 11.5). 
Figure 11.5: George Romney (1734–1802), William Beckford MP, 
1781–2.
Reproduced by kind permission of the National Trust.
Beckford was a writer and collector known for his homosexual 
encounters, whose novel Vathek described the sensual activities that 
Bentham embraced at least philosophically. We might even call Beckford 
an aesthete. Bentham calls upon him to be a partner, with whom he 
might confide secrets, who might supplement the manuscript with his 
notable literary talent: 
the author is desirous of finding, in an appropriate social 
intercourse, an external support for his faculties under a burthen 
of such a magnitude: – a sort of partner, in whose honour, in point 
of secrecy and all other points, he could confide, and by whose 
sympathy he might be cheered and supported: a co-operator, in 
whose literary talents whatever deficiency there may be in his 
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own might find a supply: who, in his own person, might find an 
amusement in giving form and order, and superior expression, and 
perhaps additional quantity, to the material which are in readiness 
to be supplied. … For all this, the author’s eye has turned itself of 
the author of the History of the Caliph Vathec.55
Bentham’s proclivity towards social intercourse and his invitation for 
someone to supplement his manuscript are in character with the body 
type that he placed in the domain of Jesus and the homosexual: a body 
that happily admits entry, that does not erect boundaries of separation; 
a body that enjoys the pleasures of social and sexual intercourse, 
thereby providing material grounding for greatest pleasure and greatest 
happiness. Beckford’s ‘sympathy’ and aesthetics are welcome because 
they are, in the figure of the homosexual Beckford, grounded in a real, 
propense body.
Is not Bentham’s dear friend Southwood Smith, called upon to 
dissect Bentham’s dead body, cutting into that body, a parallel figure 
to that of William Beckford, also called upon to give form and order, 
and expression, to the corpus in question, with his invited hand? We 
are back to Bentham’s Image. Bentham’s Image is Bentham’s body, but 
it is also Bentham’s writing, because Bentham’s Auto-Icon is a form of 
writing – what he himself named, in his ‘Auto-Icon’ essay, ‘auto-thanatog-
raphy’.56 Working with the voluminous manuscripts and their editorial 
supplements, we have a sense that Bentham’s relation to his own 
writing practice was one fully integrated with his radical philosophical 
departures from metaphysical foundations, namely, that the immediacy 
of the corporeal body is consistently present and that his written corpus 
is a body that invites the right of entry through various modes. Through 
this allowance of pleasure comes the greatest happiness of the greatest 
number. When the corpo-reality check is carried out, ‘Bentham’s Image’ 
and his written corpus deliver a steady supply of tangible substance.
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